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THE REAL DETERRENT

by Bonner Fellers

The logic of the December 20 broadcast by ex-President Hoover and that of the January 5 address by Senator Taft is compelling. Nevertheless critics found in the addresses implications of a complete abandonment of Europe with all the resultant dangers from such a course.

These critics, however, have apparently misinterpreted the Hoover-Taft position. It is true that both strongly opposed the Administration's program which would risk ground combat in Europe against the full weight of the Red Army. Mr. Hoover said, "Any attempt to make war on the Communist mass by land invasion, through the quicksands of China, India or Western Europe is sheer folly. That would be the graveyard of millions of American boys." But ex-President Hoover also urged: "hold the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans with one frontier on Britain (if she wishes to cooperate); the other on Japan, Formosa and the Philippines." Thus Hoover clearly envisaged Britain as an air base to deter war in Europe.

The essence of the Hoover-Taft position is a pragmatic, resourceful attempt to deter war, win it if war comes, and in any event avoid the slaughter of millions of our youth on the Eurasian mainland.

II

The principal reason given for the enormous European program, which the Administration is determined to undertake, is that it will deter war.

But will it?

The contention is that the presence, by 1953, of 50 or 60 Allied divisions will be the best possible war deterrent. But against these, Russia now could throw 175 divisions, some 25 of which are armored. British and our own intelligence estimates concede Russia can take Europe in a matter of days.

To offset European reluctance to provide manpower, it is proposed to rearm Western Germany. But Russia has been quoted in the press as having announced that she will fight if we rearm these German warriors. Our determination to rearm them, therefore, can scarcely be classified as a war deterrent!

Moreover, the stationing of American units supported by our air force in Western Europe -- regardless of the peaceful purpose for which

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they are intended -- can be interpreted with some justification by the Russians as an aggressive gesture.

What then is the true purpose of creating this collective defense force for Europe? The real hope is that it would act as a delaying agent until enough American manpower could be brought from the United States to turn the tide. In a recent speech, General Bradley disclosed the approved Administration concept of the only way we can win a war: "I am convinced beyond any reasonable doubt that should this nation be forced into still another conflict, we shall once more be forced to gain the inevitable victory over our dead bodies -- those of our soldiers on the ground."

If victory for the free peoples of the world can only be gained "over our dead bodies -- those of our soldiers on the ground", then it follows, irrefutably, that the free world has enjoyed its last victory.

It is true that World Wars I and II upset the world's balance of power. However, it is impossible for the United States to endeavor to restore this balance on the basis of manpower. Today there is no combination of free peoples willing to fight which can equal numerically the manpower of Russia and China. Russia can draw soldiers from China's vast reservoir of youth, merely by offering food, clothing and shelter. We are irrevocably on the short end of a 3 to 8 manpower ratio.

If Western Powers are to survive in a war against Communism, we must somehow manage to gain our decision by methods quite different from mass ground combat. Instead we must draw heavily, not primarily on our manpower, but rather on the genius of our people.

In one respect our genius, which is derived from our free system, lies in the capacity to exploit the weakest links in Stalin's armor -- his dissatisfied home population. This weakness should be exploited by a full scale psychological campaign against the Kremlin.

Instead, however, the presence of our forces on the Rhine gives Stalin a visible symbol, a unifying agent which tends to enlist support of all Russians behind the Kremlin.

Secondly, on the material plane, where does our natural genius express itself better than in Air Power?

III

It is right here, in this question of Air Power, that we can find the answer to the terrifying fact that numerically we cannot hope to right the world's balance of power. To succeed in a program of containment we must be able to strike quickly, not just on the European fronts but anywhere about and within Russia's far-flung borders. Only air

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power has the range, speed and flexibility to perform such a mission. Infantry divisions are characterized by enormous ponderosity; they cannot be shifted easily from one front to another.

Until ranges are increased, the mass of our air power cannot strike Russia without the use of overseas bases. Let us make the assumption that air bases could be held in England and Spain. But the fortunes of war might easily deprive us of their use. Sound military planning must provide flexibility to meet just such a misfortune. Africa might be utilized as a huge north and south approach to air bases in Libya or Egypt, from which medium bombers and long-range fighters could strike deep into Russia. From the Mediterranean shore of Libya it is less than 2,000 miles to the Baltic. It is only 1500 miles to Russia's chief source of oil -- Baku, in the Caucasus.

Indeed it is Africa which offers the best available ground to offset the potential weakness of Europe and its periphery. A superior Allied Air Force based in Libya could interrupt the supply routes leading from Russia into Europe! It would be a true deterrent to war, infinitely more effective in protecting Western Europe than all the infantry divisions we could station on Europe's eastern frontier.

As a matter of fact, in 1942 as U.S. Military Attache to Egypt I proposed repeatedly a similar plan to the War Department. It was my thought that from Turkey -- which later came into the war--our escorted B-24's could cut Hitler's supply lines between the Black and Baltic Seas. At this time the Nazi forces were overextended, pinned down, desperately attempting to crack the Leningrad-Moscow-Stalingrad line. Had Nazi supply lines been severed by air strikes, the entire Hitler effort would have collapsed. This concept was favored both by President Roosevelt and Assistant Secretary John McCloy but vetoed by General Marshall.

However, at this point, I should serve a warning. In 1942 the political situation in the Middle East and Africa was much less unfavorable than it is today. Much bitter history has been made since then.

We cannot hold North African bases, unless we enjoy the friendship of all the peoples in the Middle East. We must have these people's consent to use their bases. Hence on the diplomatic plane, constructive changes are absolutely necessary.

IV

Providing this political problem is solved, militarily we can hold bases in Africa. The difference between holding these and bases on the mainland of Europe lies in the fact that in Europe the bulk of the Red Army can be thrown against the land forces defending the frontier.

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Against African bases only a small fraction of the Red Army could be brought to bear. These bases have the incidental protection of great natural barriers -- the Mediterranean, the Suez Canal, the Red Sea, and a thousand miles of desert where the going is most difficult.

Attacks against African bases by the Red Army would have to be launched over the long and vulnerable desert route or they would have to be airborne. Because of these natural barriers there is no way that the full power of the Red Army can be used against Africa. Consequently, African air bases can be defended by limited ground forces -- provided we have sufficient air power to control the air above them.

If we neglect to take advantage of air bases in North Africa, Russia could move through this strategic area which is the easiest of all roads to the conquest of Africa. Then Africa and her vast natural resources, including uranium, would fall like ripe fruit into Stalin's lap. On the other hand, were we to lose the entire continent of Europe, we could still hold Africa with air supremacy over Egypt and Libya.

Although our fleet could not safely operate in the Mediterranean until we won the battle of the air, supply of African bases by air is nevertheless feasible. Meanwhile our fleet could service bases on the Gold Coast of Africa. Air facilities already exist at Takaradi. During the war a number of landing strips were built between Takaradi and Khartoum. From Khartoum north to the Mediterranean is an easy flight.

Also, an Air Force operating from North African bases would be of enormous diversionary value. Attacks could be launched to draw the Red Air Force into combat over especially selected areas so that strategic bombers, from bases in North America, could make atomic assaults against critical areas deep into Russia.

More than anything else, Russia fears air power. It is the one weapon against which Russia's terrific ground forces, enormous distances, and winters are impotent. Stalin has amply demonstrated this fear of air power in his present program of engaging our ground forces by satellite powers so that his own war potential -- heavy industries, hydroelectric power, oil fields, oil storage and communications are immune from our air attack.

A plan to strike from African bases is in no wise an abandonment of Europe. Rather it is the surest way to prevent war and win it, with minimum punishment for our Allies, if war comes.

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Not Merely Gossip *A Supplement to* Human Events Vol. VIII, No. 4

'51

By Frank C. Hanighen January 24, 1951

WAITING FOR IKE: The advent of Eisenhower is the subject of intense discussion and speculation among those who watch the Capital scene. It is anticipated that what he will say about impressions gathered on his preliminary survey of Europe will have great influence on Congress' decision in the Great Debate.

One interesting report has not yet been taken into account in these speculations. From a usually reliable source, we learn that General Eisenhower, before he left for Europe early this month, had a highly secret talk with former President Hoover. The two men exchanged views on military and foreign policy with great frankness. It is said that, before the colloquy was over, Eisenhower seemed deeply impressed by Hoover's observations on these subjects. It is recalled that the General went to Washington before embarking on his trip, and in an interview with the Washington press, stressed the "preliminary" nature of his present trip. Also, when asked to comment on the Hoover speech, he gave the enigmatic reply: "Mr. Hoover is not in uniform and I am."

It may be significant that, among political supporters of Eisenhower and advocates of his candidacy for the Presidency, there is an undercurrent of apprehension about their idol's future. They are sensitive to the fact that the General is "in uniform", that he faces a very dangerous task if he consents to head the European Army and they are mindful that Democratic political leaders have a rough way of treating military leaders and are not averse to making scapegoats of them. The names of Kimmel, Short, Denfeld, MacArthur come to mind. On a visit we made last week to New York, we heard this point extensively and intelligently argued.

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EISENHOWER AND GERMANY: No dispatches from Germany reveal any enthusiastic German response to the visit of General Eisenhower, who went to that country to urge creation of a German army. Indeed, the General's plea to the Germans to let "bygones be bygones" may appear as rather sardonic, at least to those Americans who six years ago opposed the Carthaginian peace which Eisenhower was then commencing to impose on a defeated people. The appalling contradictions and shifts of the policies of Truman and Acheson being what they are, it is little wonder that the German people found the new role of Eisenhower rather confusing. Karl von Weigand, cabling from Europe to the Hearst newspapers last week end, reported:

"There is no warm welcome in Bonn for Eisenhower . . . His ruthless carrying out of Roosevelt's 'unconditional surrender', the bitter humiliations of the first year of occupation, the hatred of the Americans, the Nuremberg trials and executions, Morgenthau's quoting of Eisenhower's alleged words of contempt for the Germans, and his 'loaning' and turning over to the French of more than 300,000 German soldiers, who had surrendered to the Americans came back vividly to the Germans."

"That their conqueror", went on Mr. von Weigand, "who had shown such little magnanimity in those days, now was coming back to Germany, before the state of war ended or a peace made, to ascertain whether the Germans would become 'limited allies' and provide a strong army contingent to participate enthusiastically in the defense of the West under his supreme command, puzzled the logically-minded Germans and was beyond their psychology." In this connection, one cannot help but recall that one of the favorite phrases of American journalists -- taking their cue from our mili-

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tary leaders of early occupation days -- was "how the Germans whine". Wasn't there a note of pleading in the General's appeal last week end to the Germans?

Another disparity in the present scene strikes those who, like HUMAN EVENTS, attacked Morgenthau-ism and advocated a constructive, healing settlement with Germany, like the "peace of 1815" (which lasted a hundred years). Those who screamed for vengeance then, alternately "whine" and threaten the Germans now. They also try to smear Hoover and Taft, who urged a constructive and merciful settlement with the Germans at the end of the war; and who today dispassionately seek a practical method of dealing with the Soviet menace to Europe. The Eisenhowers, Marshalls, Trumans, Achesons of this country who created the conditions they now dislike are still in the saddle. It is an ominous portent.

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HOT SPOT FOR NLRB: With almost disconcerting abruptness, the House Labor Committee is moving to scrutinize NLRB and its General Counsel's office through an all-embracing investigation. This comes as an epilogue to Mr. Truman's sudden move last year to dismiss Robert N. Denham, as General Counsel, and install a successor who has proven more susceptible to the Board's collective viewpoint. The Members of the House Committee feel that, through this "susceptibility", repeal of the Taft-Hartley Law (at least in vital substance) is being achieved in Board decisions. These decisions, they say, set out new definitions and qualifications of the law's provisions, and carry hair-splitting interpretations of its terms that are foreign to the intent of Congress and go very far in nullifying various clauses of the law. The Committee's inquiry promises to exceed in its scope the investigation of the old Wagner Act Board by a special House committee in 1938-9, headed by Representative Howard Smith (D., Va.).

Among the things the Committee will examine are (1) exceptions to the job-security of individual workers that are being set up by Board decisions; (2) extent to which jurisdictional strikes and secondary boycotts are being sanctioned by decisions in contravention of the law; (3) use of coercion in requiring applicants to join a union before they are given employment; (4) levying of excessive fines on individual workers for infractions of union rules, and compelling dismissal from employment for refusal to pay; and (5) setting aside other guaranties to job-security that are provided by the law.

The Committee's action is taken on its own motion, and without consultation with the Senate Labor Committee. The inquiry is expected to continue into 1952.

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MCCARTHY: Senator McCarthy (R., Wis.) has moved into another key spot with a high gadfly potential. He's a new member of the Senate Appropriations Committee. Also, he seeks assignment to the Appropriations sub-Committee dealing with State Department grants and expenditures. In this position he would have almost unlimited opportunity to probe for hidden Communists. It would be surprising if he does not get this seat. Assignment will be made by arrangement between Senator Richard B. Russell (Dem.), the Chairman of the Appropriations Committee, and Senator Styles Bridges, ranking Republican member. It is believed that Bridges is favorable to McCarthy's application.

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TAXES AND SPENDING: Mr. Truman's new budget for next year, calling for $71.5 billion, is in for some rough treatment. Critics of its non-military and non-essential items are vocal, and this time there is the possibility of drastic cutting. And the cutting may be done before there is action on tax increases. Congress is acutely tax-conscious; so much so that there is really not very much prospect of higher taxes this year, and the Government will probably have to fall back on borrowing for its needs. It is realized that higher taxes cannot be laid on the so-called rich, for that source is practically drained dry. It is also recognized that

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corporations are already paying the highest rates on record. If more taxes are laid, the load must fall chiefly on the small fry who come within the first and second brackets of taxable income.

The Truman budget is a disappointment to Congress. Items on which a reduction had been expected are not cut at all; they are generally higher than last year, and sometimes higher than they have ever been. Public works would be given $500 million more next year than this year; community housing would be given an over-all $3 billion; aid to states would amount to $400 million more next year than this year. The budget would give $30 billion for arms production; $5 billion for more military camps and training facilties; about $11 billion for foreign aid and Marshall Plan spending, and in aid to Greece, Turkey, Korea and other small countries; $3.1 billion to atomic development and civilian defense, and $8 billion to government and Fair Deal objectives. Non-essential spending in the President's budget is actually higher than last year. There's money asked for the whole flock of "campaign promises" of 1948 -- extension of unemployment aid, FEPC, Federal aid to education, defense housing, and compulsory medical insurance. Inconsistencies are so glaring that not even Mr. Truman's friends are closing their eyes to them.

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MARGINAL FUTILITY: (From Wall Street, we receive the following comment.) After all the exchanges in the country had closed on January 16, so that nobody could get in "under the wire", the Federal Reserve Board published an order requiring purchasers of securities to put down 75% of the purchase price, as against the 50% previously required. The object was to curtail credit, on the theory that credit buying is inflationary. The next morning the market opened lower, but before the end of the day several new "highs" were recorded and the volume of business was hardly affected by the new order.

Suppose a man owned $20,000 worth of securities on January 16, against which he had borrowed $10,000; the order tends to "freeze" him in his position. If he sells out, he cannot buy more than $10,000 worth of stock or bonds. Since the order does not affect his present position -- it cannot be retroactive -- he is inclined to hold on to all he has, particularly as the market is going up and shows indications of rising still higher. The effect of such "freezing" is to remove his holdings from trading; there is less stock available for buyers, and the reduction of available stock increases the price of whatever is available. The order of the FRB has had an inflationary effect, just the opposite of what had been intended.

If the stock does go up, instead of selling his holdings and taking a profit, the speculator has his profits transferred by his broker to a "special account", and now he buys on a 75% basis, meanwhile holding on to what he owns. Thus, let us say the stock he bought on a down payment of $10,000 is now worth $25,000. The profit of $5,000 is transferred to this "special account", and with this he can purchase an additional $6,250 worth. The scarcity is accentuated, prices go up.

If the stock should go down to anywhere near his equity, he would be inclined to hold it and hope for a rise, unless he is in dire need of money.

On purchases made after January 17, more money will be required than before, and the effect of that is to drive out the marginal buyer. The marginal buyer, the fellow who is tickled with a small profit, is driven out of the field. The "strong" buyers, those who do not need the profits to buy necessary or even luxury goods, are never quick to dump their holdings; they can wait and hold. The new ruling plays into their hands, for it reduces competition from the "weak" buyers, the ones who are constantly running in and out.

Thus, the effect of the ruling is inflationary, not deflationary, as far as securities are concerned. Also, the small gambler is put under a disability and the position of the big gambler is improved.

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Book Events

Where Are We At? by Thomas H. Barber. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. $3.00.
Review by Edna Lonigan.

Thomas H. Barber has had a characteristically American career. He has been a lawyer, city official, cowpuncher, soldier, investment banker, dirt farmer and teacher of military government. In short, he is a true enterpriser, a breed which will quickly disappear as the manpower experts extend their hold over us.

Mr. Barber began early to notice the hampering effects of governmental regulation on production. He formulated his doubts in a clear question: what is the dividing line between necessary laws and harmful ones? He spent twenty years trying to find the answer. The result is an enheartening book.

Mr. Barber found that in medieval and modern Europe landholders won the right to hold up food prices, guilds to hold up the price of manufactured goods, and merchants to hold up the price of imports, because they believed that was the way to increase their incomes. In America, in the early days there were very few laws, and few had legal power to raise the prices they were paid. Left to themselves, men quickly turned to the work which brought them the highest returns. Everybody did what he could do best, and so the total output rose, prices fell and everyone in the nation benefited. For three hundred years our prosperity grew. Then like children we set to work weaving a net of laws by which businessmen, union workers, farmers and investors could fix their prices by legal means. We have almost completely rebuilt the trap from which our forebears escaped.

The trouble, Mr. Barber finds, is "privilege", that is, economic "rights" upheld by legal means. The remedy lies in recognition that government has no business dealing with any economic problem -- a sound conclusion if there ever was one.

In a chapter called "Where We Are At", Mr. Barber describes the total change in the character of the presidency. Our "President" is no longer an American constitutional president. He has inordinate powers over money, and the propaganda staff to hide from us what is happening. This new-style president must decide more problems than any one man can decide. Therefore the powers of the presidency are really exercised by his assistants. "The President is so surrounded that he is ceasing to be the man we elected, and he is becoming a group -- in other words The Presidency." He is surrounded by "several hundred intelligent non-elected bureaucrats who make most of the decisions, and who can to a large extent control the information he receives". This is a correct picture of Mr. Truman, and of Mr. Roosevelt in his later days; Mr. Barber knows his bureaucracy.

Mr. Barber faces the conclusion which most Americans still do not like to face. "All this has forged a chain of circumstances that logically must lead us to totalitarianism." The ultimate winners will be the Communists because they control most of the vehicles of propaganda, and because they know how to induce good people to take the steps which will surely bring totalitarianism.

What to do about it? For one thing we are no worse off than we were at the end of the American Revolution. We can reverse our course whenever we wish. And we do not need leaders! We need to throw off our chains. "The whole bureaucratic wood must be cut down, and the free economy re-established." Every group must give up the legal privileges it has won, and return to a free market economy.

Mr. Barber misses one point. "The queerest thing of all," he says, "is that there is no propaganda drive at all in this country for what everyone really wants, namely a free economy." It is not queer at all. The collectivists know perfectly well that if writers had a chance to make heard their defense of a free Society, tyranny would soon be ended. Hence such phenomena as the drive of the Buchanan Committee, described in Stand Up and Fight (HUMAN EVENTS Analysis, June 21, 1950).

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UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA RECEIVED JAN 31 '51 LIBRARY

By Bertrand de Jouvenel U.S.A. -- January, 1951

THE U.S. TODAY: What is my impression of the American state of mind? Of course, in seven weeks I have not covered enough ground to form any reliable opinion. But what I have found I would depict as (1) great determination to oppose Soviet imperialism, (2) considerable distrust of the way this is being done, (3) almost complete confusion as to how it should be done.

The distrust, as I see it, is chiefly the outcome of the almost unbelievable disparity which has been found to exist between the Administration's commitments and the means it mustered. It is almost four years since President Truman vowed to defend free peoples everywhere, a statement which greatly heartened us overseas. It comes as something of a surprise to find that the intervening years have been empty of any effort to put some power behind that statement.

Although I have tried to follow closely the course of American affairs from France, I was shocked on arriving here to find as little military preparedness as I had left behind me. I remember that one evening last summer, when I was recuperating from a day filled up with urgent pleading, a brilliant friend of mine came in and offered me a thought: "You know," he said, "I wonder whether the Americans do not stand exactly where we do, unarmed as we are, with no more sense of urgency than we have, with no clearer conception of the objective to be reached, and with the same concern to preserve economic normalcy." This I shrugged off. But he insisted: "Look," he said, "we have had these four years some 150 thousand men in Indo-China and that's one-fourth of our forces. Now the Americans have about 150,000 in Korea, and I read that it's most of their army! We hear of our army being built up to ten and later to twenty divisions. That's not enough. But I see that the Americans have ten divisions and are to build up to fifteen (as it then was). Isn't that even more absurd than our ten or twenty? They ask when we are going to get back to the number of divisions we had in 1914. Shouldn't we ask when they are going to get back to the number they had in 1945? Sure, it's a pity we haven't got the army of the Marne and of Verdun, but it is in the nature of things that this should be even deader than the American army of 1945. And where is that?"

American opinion is now making the discovery my friend made. It is pondering the course of events since 1945, remembering that the U.S. had the mightiest army of the day, quite an irresistible force and on top of that the monopoly of the A-bomb. No use was made of these overwhelming means to order the Russians out of Europe. If that had been done, Western Europe with this weight off its chest, could easily attend to its own security and there would be no occasion for the demands now being made upon the American nation.

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PSYCHOLOGICAL EFFECT OF KOREA: The distrust is enchanced by the reverses in Korea. It seems to me that the main reason for intervention in Korea was to give an earnest of American determination. It was for psychological effect on the world, and has been successful in that. But it has on the other hand produced an unfavorable psychological result in the States. I clearly remember that Sunday, the 25th of June, when a friend drove up to lunch with me and apprised me that South Korea had been invaded. Being quite an important person he could also tell me what was the line of the French government in the matter. It was highly desirable, he said, that the U.S. should take action, for this would convince Western European opinion that the

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American Republic executed her promise to assist free peoples against aggression. Immediate American action would bolster up European morale by convincing us that similar action would be taken in the case of Europe.

It is however apparent to me over here that the Korean venture, probably undertaken mainly to convince Europeans that the same action would be taken in the case of Europe, has in fact convinced a great number of Americans that the same action should not be taken in the case of Europe. To them the costly misfortune in Korea prefigures a far costlier misfortune in Europe, where the experiment, they feel, would only be repeated on a larger scale. I have found this opinion widely prevalent among the people I have met.

I have not been very successful in my plea that Korea and Europe present two very different cases: that Korea of itself was of no interest to the U.S. while Western Europe is of the very greatest. Putting Europe back into shape can provide the U.S. with such an ally that the Americans can again stop thinking about danger from the East and turn their full attention to the Pacific. But this can occur only if Europe is given time and occasion to solidify and she just won't if she is not assured of being defended by the U.S. The will to defense in Europe today is a function of the chances of effective defense, as they are perceived by the Europeans. Their appraisal of these chances in turn is a function of their belief in the speed and volume of American intervention. The firmer their belief, the greater their willingness. If that is so, it would be disastrous to make the commitment of American forces to the defense of Europe dependent upon evidence of European willingness. For then the very thing needed to induce willingness would be withheld until willingness appeared. "If that is the psychological condition of Europe," say some American friends, "Europe does not deserve our help." That, it seems to me, is not the point. The point is whether the U.S. needs a strong Europe, and I am convinced it does. Thus only can the United States avoid being an armed camp ever on the alert.

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NEW U.S. SITUATION: Calling the conflict into which we are drifting by the name of World War III is, I fear, gravely misleading to American opinion. The two first wars were, from an American point of view, essentially different from this one. They were wars in which the United States were the decisive factor but not a main party to the quarrel. The U.S. could certainly have avoided intervening in the first war and have left the Europeans to fight it out between themselves. They might quite conceivably have kept out of the second. Both times they tipped the balance. But this language by itself implies that there was something already in the scale into which they threw their weight. The enemy against which they took up arms was being held in check by others. In 1917, while Russia had fallen, France and Britain were holding out against Germany. In 1941, while France had fallen, Britain and Russia were holding out. Thus American intervention had only to provide the margin which gave victory. Not so this time. The American Republic to date, provides the chief and almost exclusive counterweight to the Soviet Empire and there is no one standing behind the United States to tip the balance in its favor.

In other terms, the U.S. has moved from the position of the great power in reserve to that of the front line force. And there is no reserve. While France and Britain in their dark hours felt that nothing was lost because these mighty United States were there to retrieve everything, the United States themselves have no other United States to do this for them.

Senator Taft, in one of his recent speeches, said that the U.S. should hold the balance of power in the world as England in her day held it in Europe. A very desirable situation; but in order to be attained and maintained there must be at least two forces between which you hold the balance. If there is only one, then you don't

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hold the balance of power, you are yourself in the scale and you have to make the weight. This is a far less desirable situation: it is a situation in which the American Republic finds itself for the first time. This is new. This is different.

* * *

BALANCE OF POWER: If I were an American, finding that my country has slid from the enviable position of holding the balance of power to the unenviable position of being in the scale almost alone, I would have two preoccupations, one academic, the other practical. I would want to know why two great victories have so worsened the national position, and I would want to get out of the scale, back into the arbitral position. If the two great American victories have worsened the position of America, it is presumably because the political conduct of these wars was erroneous. I would want to revise such ideas as directed this conduct. But I would also most urgently want to get out of this position.

The only means of getting out of it seem to be the building up of forces capable by themselves of holding the Soviets in check. Now the forces which used to hold Russia in check were Germany, Austria-Hungary, the Ottoman Empire and Japan. Austria-Hungary fell a victim to the first World War, and no greater loss has been sustained by the Western World. Germany and Japan were overrun in the second World War and the purpose was pursued of eradicating the military spirit from them for all time. The only one of the historic limiting powers which still stands is that remnant of the Ottoman Empire rescued by Kemal, to whom statues should be erected. Nor would even this have happened had Lloyd George had his way.

China seemed at one time to provide a new limiting power in Asia. She was to be one of the Big Five of the Second World Peace. It is strange indeed that her interests were sacrificed to Russian demands in order to bring Russia into the war with Japan, a most inconvenient intervention in that it gives Russia a diplomatic say-so in the disposal of Japan. China was to be upheld by all means; and yet its friendly government was abandoned and this abandonment justified by a public vilification unprecedented between one ally and another.

So all that is left is Western Europe. If that can be reflated to such a state of political coherence and military power that it will balance the force of Soviet Russia, then and only then can the U.S. move back to the position of holding the balance of power in Europe. They still, however, would be in the front line in Asia, unless Japan could be reflated to such power that she could hold in check the Russian-Chinese combination -- which is most improbable.

To sum up: the conditions necessary to the restoration of a balance of power held by the U.S. seem to be that forces should be erected in Asia and in Europe capable by themselves of balancing the Soviet world, so that the U.S. need only tip the scales. Then and then only would the American Republic be in the position which England managed to sustain over centuries, and which allowed her to develop her economy in peace and freedom while other nations were mutually balancing camps.

Now it is plain that the rebuilding of Japanese forces, if undertaken, can be carried out only thanks to American protection under the form of sea and air patrolling. The equivalent of these conditions for Western Europe is land patrolling, during the interim period of rebuilding European forces. This can be done within a short term of years, two or three. Thus the American commitment of forces may well be restricted to such a term of years, reassuring American opinion that the effort is not for ever, while also reassuring Russia, if she needs to be reassured, that the West does not propose to pile up both American and European forces in Europe for an aggression. It would be emphasized that the Americans are there only as a temporary alternative to the absence of European forces, and will go home as local forces come into existence. In the meantime I would certainly supplement the American forces sent over by the formation of a legion of European volunteers called to-

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gether by General Eisenhower. I think the response to such a call would demonstrate to American opinion that there are hundreds of thousands of Europeans more willing than their governments seem to be.

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WANTED: MORAL CONSOLIDATION OF WESTERN EUROPE: I found Americans puzzled by what seems to them a lack of fortitude in the Europeans: should not nations which enjoy the blessings of liberty be willing to fight for it, whatever the odds? Such has been the behavior of some historic communities which have stood up to the last man without any such hope as the United States offer.

Defense is after all the supreme expression of a militant Conservatism. What is to be conserved may be ancient or it may be the result of a quite recent revolution. Anyhow it is of high value. Where the moral conditions are such, the spirit of the City lives on in all its individual parts. It is not enough to destroy its army, to kill or capture its leaders, it fights on as long as there are men left.

But the above happens only under certain social conditions. Now thirty-five years of confusion have gone to destroy such conditions in Europe. Europe has been physically exhausted by two disastrous wars. But that is not the worst. The worst is that its political and social institutions, and the attendant loyalties have been subjected to almost ceaseless and brutal change, a process which has produced everywhere a sense of injustice and resentment, a bewilderment and an uncertainty injurious to the social order.

For instance, a German of fifty has served the Kaiser in the first World War, has been a citizen of the Social-Democratic Weimar Republic, has conformed to the Hitler regime, has now become a citizen of Western Germany, and has reeducated his young to conform with the demilitarization instructions of Occupation. It is right now to rearm against Russia. Will it still be adjudged right tomorrow?

It is almost impossible for an American to imagine how chequered the career of a European has been. Such continual upheaval and reversal of standards has resulted in complete insecurity of individual rights, of social relations and even of moral judgments. The property of yesterday was taken away because you became an alien, a public enemy or simply because you fell a victim of nationalization or inflation. The valueless claim of today might be turned into an asset by a political change. Your proclaimed guilt of yesterday may be the foundation for your present reputation, but beware whom you associate with, because any acquaintance may be brought in evidence against you. Such uncertainty destroys a society as such. What a society cannot bear is arbitrariness. There must be certain immutable standards by which behavior is measured so that some people are encouraged, others discouraged. But you cannot successively reward, punish, exalt and denounce the same actions without causing the utmost disorder.

But strong characters emerge from such trials strengthened. I would like readers to picture such men as rebuilders of Europe. Scattered all over the Continent, they are men of different nationalities, or different social origins, using different vocabularies, more often than not unknown to each other, but working to the same end. They are just such men as crossed the Ocean to found or find a better society. But this time they do their pioneering in the Old World. In its utmost peril they are not willing to abandon it to its face. As far as their individual power extends they clear the ground, cutting and burning down the wild brush of false ideas, wishful thinking, vain hopes, paralyzing fears, and harmful resentments. They build up their little log cabin of determination and try to make a center of moral security.

Let me venture a suggestion predicated on the immense good will of Americans: in the days of our physical hunger, some Americans "adopted" a French family or individual. Why shouldn't Americans today individually seek out European pioneers and give them moral comfort and encouragement? No government can do that job.

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